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Abstract 
The paper probes into an antithetical aspect of China’s economic reforms in the global 
context by focusing on the recent developments of China’s intellectual property regime 
as a key component of its knowledge-driven and innovation-oriented economy. It 
highlights China’s political divergence against its economic convergence in its decade-
long reforms, in particular, its state-oriented innovation system as against the world’s 
neo-liberal economic order by analyzing a fundamental theme in a cutting-edge legal 
system. In core areas such as high-tech products and industrial innovation, the last 
decade witnessed China’s preeminent transformation from a passive follower to a 
proactive advocator of IP standards. However, certain entrenched limits characterizing 
China’s state-oriented economy and cultural system such as information blockade and 
coercive technology transfer serve as catalysts that are apt to provoke acrimonious 
confrontation between China and major economies. In this sense, China’s incomplete 
reforms have taken on a new form: as China’s influence on the global economy grows, 
conflicts of diverse national priorities become more palpable than simple-minded 
economic cooperation. 
 
Keywords: China, Chinese economy, globalization, intellectual property, Sino-US 
trade war 
1. Introduction 
China’s rise as a global economic power is, indisputably, one of the most phenomenal 
development in the past few decades. However, the underlying factors that shape and 
determine the country’s striking growth have remained more or less a mystery. This is 
largely due to the fact that China’s stunning economic achievements are concomitant 
with its most entrenched socialist political system, a remnant that, surprisingly, 
survived the Cold War. Since the 1980s, there have been debates between two 
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schools of economic discourses regarding the implications of China’s reform 
performance: one advocates the creation of non-capitalist institutions, whereas the 
other endorses only those mechanisms that converge with the capitalist designs 
(Sachs & Woo, 1997). 
Basically, we would agree with the convergence school in ascribing China’s economic 
success primarily to the reform measures that are synchronized with the designs of 
non-socialist market economies. Yet, this premise seems to be overshadowed in the 
new century, particularly in the wake of China’s growing global political influence 
underpinned by its economic weight (Hoover Institution, 2018). Since the global 
financial crisis of 2008, a number of economists have reflected on the dominance of 
the neoliberalism in terms of both its theoretical foundations and its policy implications 
in the past three decades (Rodrik, 2017; Bresser-Pereira, 2010). As a result, China 
has given full play to the leverage of its state-owned or state-backed economy on the 
basis of the “Beijing Consensus” in contrast to the “Washington Consensus” which 
embraced a neoliberalist path of economic development (Huang, 2018). This has 
become especially conspicuous since Mr. Xi Jinping became the helmsman of the 
economy with the world’s largest population. 
No doubt the political economy embedded in the Washington Consensus is subject to 
various criticism by even some leading commentators. For instance, Stiglitz (2002) 
elaborated on the side effects of “market fundamentalism” and the “one size fits all” 
treatment of individual markets. Rodrik (2006) pointed out that a “standard reform 
agenda” may not be appropriate remedy for developing countries or impoverished 
areas. Birdsall and Fykuyama (2011) questioned the role of “foreign financial fetish” 
despite the benefits of global trade and stressed the role of government regulation as 
the “visible hand” in maintaining not only remarkable economic growth but also social 
stability in developing countries, in particular those like China. Ghodsee’s study (2017) 
is concerned about the economic difficulties that some former socialist countries 
experienced in their transition from communism to market economies. 
It is, at least partly, for these reasons that some countries, especially China, have 
resorted to localizing their development models and agendas and summarized their 
philosophy in the idea of “Beijing Consensus”. With regard to the economic rationales, 
there are noteworthy endeavors in differentiating between the neoliberalist economics 
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as the policy consideration featuring the Washington Consensus and the “mainstream 
economics” hinging on the Samuelson traditions. In that connection, influential 
Chinese economists have articulated their support of the government’s overriding role 
in backing strategic industries and state-owned enterprises. In defending such a 
stance, Lin (2017) warns against the middle-income trap in China’s structural 
transformation and upgrading. Zheng (2019) even relies on the traditional economics 
in arguing against the inconsistencies of the neoliberalist framework. 
Yet, such debates on economic developments should be placed in the larger context 
of contemporary political and legal contingencies so that they could be perceived from 
a broader and overall horizon. In the past few years, the world has witnessed an 
unprecedented tide of political turmoil since the end of the Cold War. For instance, the 
economy of the European Union – an area in which the neoliberalist theories 
originated – has been deeply trapped in constant governmental intervention featured 
by the loose monetary policy and the financial measures of “quantitative easing” since 
2008. Lack of incentives for the working class due to the overgenerous welfare 
programs and indiscriminate priority given to the demands for “equality” – often 
branded as a hallmark of “political correctness” – have generated a strong tide of 
backlash of populism, the most remarkable result of which is the Brexit referendum in 
the UK. Further, the American political system, which assumes the leading role among 
western liberal democracies, is allegedly suffering from a “decay” spawned by the 
protectionist measures adopted by the Trump administration (Fukuyama, 2016). 
Amid such ongoing turmoil around the world featured by piecemeal but often 
interrelated struggles for an “independent path”, neo-Keynesian approaches, 
propositions of either the “European model” or the “Asian way”, and even anti-
globalization movements are looming over the horizon. Increasingly as such, China is 
deviating rapidly even from Deng’s earlier blueprint of market economic reforms to 
embrace its “unique” development programs and agendas with much stronger socialist 
tinge reminiscent of Mao’s rule. Such political divergence is both understandable and 
worrying, however, considering both China’s domestic and the global political 
developments. In particular, China’s trade relations with the US and its allies have 
been affected considerably by the Sino-US trade war over the last two years. While 
the US and China are in the course of negotiating a deal towards the end of the trade 
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war, there are some fundamental differences that are not easily reconcilable under the 
aegis of any immediate trade agreements. 
One of such palpable fundamental issues at stake is China’s intellectual property (IP) 
regime, as it is a highly attractive “business law” area that has been channelled into 
the world trade law system. On the other hand, Chinese IP law is informed 
overwhelmingly by China’s political framework, and differs fundamentally from IP law 
in western countries. For one thing, in the constantly ongoing trade frictions between 
China and the US over the past three decades, information blockade and coercive 
technology transfer have only emerged recently as a top item on the list of negotiation. 
Such “trade barriers” are only one of the cascade of endogenous features rooted in 
the political, economic, and legal contingencies that the Beijing Consensus breeds in. 
However, China’s IP law has remained a leading inducing factor and catalyst of trade 
frictions between China and its trade partners, in particular, the US. It will continue to 
be so in the years to come, as IP law plays an incrementally important role in promoting 
the development of China’s strategic industries, technological innovation, and 
structural upgrading. 
It is for these reasons that this article will focus on the political economy of Chinese IP 
law and analyze its most recent developments through a global perspective. To make 
it clear, we are, certainly, not arguing here that information blockade and coercive 
technology transfer are the cause of the ongoing Sino-US trade war. Nor do we even 
mean to say that problems arising from China’s IP area constitute the most 
fundamental difference between the two countries behind the trade war. Rather, we 
intend to conduct a case study and reveal how IP law, usually deemed a purely 
technical issue involved in global trade, might be leveraged to reflect hugely diverse 
values pertaining to the political and economic paths chosen by two most influential 
countries in the world. By unpacking a leading and persistent inducing catalyst of trade 
frictions, we aim to show the resilience of and the differences between two political 
economies through a chic prism that compels our attention. 
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2. The Convergence and Divergence of the Chinese Economy in 
the Global Context 
Reform Hope: Economic Liberalization as a Path towards Political Convergence  
Ever since China’s leadership initiated its reform and opening up process in 1978, 
there has been great hope that the world’s most populous country would integrate into 
the existing global governance structure. Economic reforms in China, combined with 
the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1989, resulted in overwhelming confidence of 
Western countries in the superiority of liberal democracies to authoritarian regimes 
(Fukuyama, 1989).  
At this time, embracing foreign investments and capitalism was hailed as a step 
towards unleashing dynamic economic development, and the aggregate welfare gains 
of open economic systems acted as a major driver for accepting the abolishment of 
the planned economy. China’s increasing initiatives of capitalist market reforms were 
widely seen as a recognition of the strength of market-based systems for building 
productive and innovative economic systems – the backbone of rich, industrialized 
countries, for it was long held that the economic wealth created by more liberal 
economic systems would provide the basis for more democratic political systems 
(Lipset, 1959). 
Presumably, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 would 
further speed up domestic reforms first initiated in 1978, facilitate its integration into 
the global economic order, and, eventually, boost global trade and investment. Clearly, 
the integration of a large country such as China with its political system and values so 
incompatible with those of western countries constituted unique challenges to the 
WTO, for successful assimilation of such a new member into the existing international 
bodies would, ideally, “try to contain and intermediate these prospective frictions” 
(Noland, 1995). 
However, this seemed an attainable target at the time in light of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the perceived superiority of western liberal democracies with their 
market-based economic system. This is because economic systems need to respond 
to external and internal factors over time and are, therefore, never stable 
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(Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). In an era of globalization, particularly, all countries 
are exposed to the influence of different systems at greater speeds than to changes 
in the national arrangement, and it is increasingly difficult to isolate technological 
changes from social, economic or political developments.  
No matter whether a country wants a systemic change, the underlying institutional 
framework of the country will come under pressure to adapt itself to external 
contingencies. This will depend, for instance, on the domestic contours of the industrial 
relations system, the system of training and education, the internal structure of firms, 
the structured relationships between firms, the financial markets, the conception of 
fairness and justice, the structure of the state and its policies, as well as the country’s 
customs and norms. All of these factors may have profound implications on the 
resulting economic system (or social system of production) (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
In this context, globalization could act as a catalyst for the diffusion of both common 
production technologies and the underlying economic systems, to the extent that both 
the decisions within the WTO and the concomitant liberalization have far-reaching 
implications for the national economic system. Generally, supranational institutions 
attempt to establish a level-playing field on a global or transnational level, under which 
nation states not only conduct trade but also compete with one another. In tandem 
with increasing financial liberalization, the growing global capital mobility acts as 
another driver for domestic change.  Consequently, government behaviour would be 
subject to the scrutiny of financial actors and any policy considerations, even if the 
latter might be deemed unfavourably disciplined.  
Such widespread optimism on the part of western countries generated and facilitated 
the belief that China would likewise continue its path towards economic liberalization 
which could, eventually, lead to a fundamental political change. Indeed, both South 
Korea (1988) and Taiwan (1996) served as good examples of illiberal countries 
transforming into democracies following a period of rapid economic ascent. 
In fact, Chinese leaders who initiated and supported the Opening-up and Reforms 
recognized that timely policy adjustments would best serve its own economic interests. 
For example, a fundamental condition for any meaningful economic reform is the 
protection of private property rights. Hayek (1945) considers this, together with the 
7 | P a g e  
 
associated economic freedom, a prerequisite for the incentivizing use of knowledge 
creation and sharing. Indeed, both Weber and Hayek viewed the element of market 
predictability reassured by the rule of law in protecting property rights as essential for 
capitalist development (Weede, 2004). It was clear to the Chinese leadership that, 
without strengthening the protection of private property, economic development would 
face systemic constraints. Although radical reform was not an option to China’s 
leadership, China’s accession to the WTO did help initiate deeper reforms of the 
dominant status of state-owned enterprises, inducing major changes to China’s 
economic structure, including the acceleration of China’s privatization, economic 
liberalization, and the strengthening of market principles.  
In this process, however, China’s previous institutional arrangements underwent 
significant disruptions, and certain vulnerabilities associated with greater integration 
into the existing global economic order became a serious concern (Breslin, 2003). For 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), maintaining political control remained a key 
constraint on any form of economic reforms. Any form of shock therapy, as the eastern 
European countries experienced in their transition from planned to market economies 
(as well as the parallel political change), did not present itself as viable a policy option 
to Chinese leadership. 
Overall, China’s reforms are characterized by the approach of advancing towards a 
goal via gradual, often slow stages. Past or recent efforts of reform experimentation 
such as that on special economic zones, mixed-ownership, interest rate, or the 
introduction of the Hong Kong-Shanghai Stock Connect mechanism remain the 
hallmark of China’s reform process. In spite of this gradualist approach, China’s 
continuous efforts of reforms and opening-up often fuel the argument for China’s path 
towards institutional convergence with the western world. 
Incomplete Reforms: Economic Reforms Alone Are No Guaranteed Driver for 
Convergence  
While adopting a capitalist economic system, different countries may exhibit distinct 
limits of institutional convergence. As a result, there is no single optimal institutional 
arrangement even across the western world. The disparate, individual coordinating 
mechanisms that countries retain for themselves will hinder convergence towards 
virtually identical systems. According to Hollingsworth and Boyer, institutions 
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embedded in a larger framework prevent the entire system from radical and 
fundamental changes, and changes induced into one institutional sphere cannot be 
isolated from other spheres. As a result of this historical institutional framework, 
countries are riveted to a certain form of path dependency.  
Although systems will change over time, they are limited by the past framework which 
have implications for the future framework. Hollingsworth and Boyer also recognize 
that the functional institutional arrangement in one country does not necessarily apply 
to another country in an identical way. It is acknowledged that systems, which are no 
longer able to compete on the international arena, will come under pressure to adopt 
better performing practices. Nevertheless, practices coming from elsewhere may need 
to be modified and adapted to the existing institutional framework.  
Under the leadership of the CCP, there will be clear limits as to how far China will 
converge with western countries. Its path dependency is shaped by the CCP’s strategy 
of balancing economic reforms absent political reforms. The unchallenged position of 
the CCP sets forth serious institutional challenges in the form of both policy 
contradictions in a restrictive political environment and efforts towards further 
liberalization in the economic sphere. In that sense, the CCP leadership manipulates 
the country at the heart of capitalism with “Chinese characteristics”. 
Thus, any proposal of changes to the institutional arrangement of China’s economic 
system must take into account the country’s constraining political factors. For one thing, 
China always claims that it has adhered to its earlier approach of “one center, two 
basic points”, and “continued to improve the socialist basic economic system, 
mechanism and institutions by continuously pushing forward the reform of the socialist 
market economic system” (Huang, 2018). Huang argues that “this means that China 
has not followed the Washington Consensus, but the Beijing Consensus.” Further, the 
global financial crisis in 2008 fuelled a lasting tide of criticism of the underlying neo-
liberal economic theory (Stiglitz, 1997; Bresser-Pereira, 2010). Together with the 
alleged “political decay” of liberal democracies, the “western model” does not provide 
the CCP a convincing example to follow (Fukuyama, 2016). In the light of these 
perceived institutional deficiencies, China’s development path seeks to pursue its own 
development path with Chinese characteristics under the guidelines of socialist 
theories. 
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The adaptation of capitalist ideologies, therefore, serves the CCP’s ultimate goal of 
“perfecting” the Chinese socialist economic system by creating new theoretical 
foundations for economic development. The hope that China would continuously adapt 
to a liberal democracy while pursuing greater economic reforms has never been a 
realistic scenario. In addition, China is confronted with the challenge for breaking 
though the middle-income trap and its evolving economic system will still need to face 
its greatest test. The rapid economic development was due to improved allocation of 
the means of production, as is manifested by the “East Asian Development Model” 
successfully deployed in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
China’s GDP per capita has reached around 10,000 USD following a period of rapid 
economic growth. Considering the double-digit growth in the past decades, it is only 
natural that economic growth is beginning to fall to lower levels. To catch up with the 
average income of the advanced economies, China’s development must continue to 
maintain high productivity growth. Whereas China largely benefited from the 
demographic dividend with a surplus of low-skilled workers shifting from agriculture in 
rural areas to manufacturing in urban areas, its future growth will rely on a much higher 
degree of knowledge dividend. This requires not only better-educated workforce, but 
also the ability of its leadership to nurture an institutional environment supportive of 
fostering innovation.  
Challenging an Autocratic Regime’s Ability to Foster Innovation 
Research based on cross-country analysis does indicate a negative relation between 
autocratic political regime and economic development resulting from larger dispersion 
of growth rates (Glaeser, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). Nevertheless, 
the supposition that economic liberalization needs and facilitates political liberalization 
is yet to be tested in China. So far China’s political system has not been captured in 
any form of debacle despite its constant pursuit of economic reforms, which seems to 
vitiate many caveats against an immediate collapse of the CCP. On the other hand, 
autocratic capitalism is capable of creating the underlying institutional stability and 
trust necessary for rapid economic development (Ang, 2018). However, the verdict is 
still pending, as China’s economy faces the challenge of an innovation-driven 
transition to the next stage of economic development.  
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The International Monetary Fund’s list of advanced economies as of now is exclusively 
composed of liberal democracies with the exception of Singapore, Macau, and Hong 
Kong. Being part of China under the one country two systems approach, both special 
administrative regions of Macau and Hong Kong have maintained their own post-
colonial institutional setting. This becomes most apparent in Hong Kong’s recent 
struggle for fundamental institutional change, which exerts pressure on China’s top 
leadership. By contrast, Singapore provides a successful example of transforming into 
an advanced economy without becoming democratic. However, Singapore’s political 
system has unique characteristics with higher degrees of political freedom and judicial 
independence than China under the CCP.  
By contrast, China’s institutional arrangement varies considerably from that of most 
western countries, despite the ongoing domestic reforms and greater integration into 
the global economy (Faberberg and Srholec, 2007). In fact, the willingness of China’ 
top leadership to engage in economic reforms is only associated with the underlying 
necessity to increase the competitiveness of China’s economy. Starting in the 1980s, 
China has already introduced a series of changes to its national innovation system by 
strengthening the “civilian-orientation, increasing the role of industries, and closer 
interactions among industries, universities and government” (Sun, 2002). However, 
despite the rapid GDP growth in the past decades, China’s economy still suffers from 
inefficiencies including a lack of innovation, most pronounced in the still large state-
owned sector. 
Whereas China’s economy requires a transition by strengthening its innovation 
capacity, the political environment is becoming more restrictive under Xi Jinping. 
Expansion of party cells in private companies, build-up of a surveillance state, and 
strengthening of ideology are just a few examples of Xi’s political maneuver, which 
aims to manifest the position of the CCP rather than facilitate any form of political 
liberalization. While there is appetite for reform in the economic sphere, nothing has 
emerged in the political sphere on a comparable scale. As such, China’s innovation 
system, which is still in the making, confronts a number of uncertainties, and its future 
will depend on whether China is able to initiate corresponding political reforms that 
buttress its innovation-oriented transition. 
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For instance, one of the key elements that provoked the Sino-US trade war was the 
“Made in China 2025” strategy. Although China’s ambition to build a more competitive 
innovation system predates the launch of that strategy in May 2015, the strategy itself 
can be seen as a major policy push which goes far beyond the ten core industries 
defined therein. State-driven industrial policy combined with stronger integration of 
private sectors aim to improve capital allocation, the innovation landscape, and 
technological autonomy, all of which are necessary to transform the nation into a 
global high-tech nation by 2049.  
From the CCP’s perspective, however, success in attaining these targets is crucial to 
further legitimizing its political grip over the country (Zenglein and Holzman, 2019). For 
this reason, this round of Sino-US trade war goes beyond the previous trade frictions 
and has often been referred to as a “protracted war” between the core interests of the 
Chinese top leadership and those of an “awakening” US government per se. The 
ongoing deterioration of the Sino-US relationship amid the unfolding escalation of such 
a trade war exacerbates China’s difficulties in tackling the impending institutional 
challenges its economic transition is facing. 
There are some promising aspects, though. One limitation suppressing potential 
innovation in autocratic regimes is a lack of investment in human capital, as 
researches show that, generally, dictatorships have a less educated population 
(Glaeser, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). While this observation might 
be relevant to the majority of non-democratic nations, it does not apply to countries 
(like China) following the East Asian Development Model characterized by heavy 
investment in education. Another distinct feature is China’s endorsement of 
entrepreneurship. Despite a stricter political environment, China has a flourishing start-
up community, a phenomenon that runs counterintuitive to a repressive political 
environment.   
During the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, the top leadership 
hallowed the role of the state-owned sector as an integral pillar of the Chinese 
economic system. The CCP leadership also espoused strengthening market 
mechanisms in this context. Under Xi Jinping, however, the underlying ideologies of 
economic reforms are based on the principles of Marxist political economics (Huang, 
2018). Such a theoretical framework highlights the strategic role of state-owned 
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enterprises as well as strong political support by the state (Lin, 2017). Therefore, any 
interpretation that the mandate of strengthening market mechanisms should land in 
any form of western-style liberalization would be misplaced. Instead, such policy 
adjustment only recognizes the strength of the underlying institutional foundations of 
western economic systems. As part of China’s efforts of building a system of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”, however, this political mandate does not aim at 
replacing but complementing the existing institutional structure under the leadership 
of the CCP.  
What seems to be a strategic contraction to the CCP is an integral part of its plan of 
addressing the future challenges to China’s economic development. Further efforts of 
the Chinese leadership towards liberalizing the economy include strengthening market 
mechanisms and the rule by law, both of which aim at facilitating an innovation system 
capable of competing with today’s advanced economies. Moreover, adapting China’s 
institutional building blocks to those of western liberal democracies represents merely 
a gesture of contained openness, whose purpose is to make foreign innovation a 
catalyst for China’s competitiveness.  
In short, from the CCP’s standpoint, China’s economic reforms will not engender any 
contradiction by deepening economic liberalization and further opening up to the world 
while enforcing a stricter political environment. On the contrary, increasing economic 
liberties should be balanced by a more repressive regime, both of which serve to 
strengthen China’s economic development in the long term. The key issue for the CCP, 
therefore, is to develop efficient institutional arrangement, especially appropriate legal 
mechanism, which both foster economic development whilst ensuring political control. 
The challenges to economic theories posed by China’s economic rise are now entering 
a crucial phase. If China succeeds in becoming an innovation power while remaining 
a largely autocratic regime, the Beijing consensus might turn into an ontological 
alternative development model for many authoritarian governments.   
3. Intellectual Property: More Than an Instrument of Promoting 
Knowledge-driven and Innovation-oriented Economy 
In the following parts, we will turn to China’s IP law regime. This is not to say that 
Chinese IP law is the cause of or solution to China’s current choice of its political 
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philosophy and economic path. Instead, we intend to provide a case study from the 
perspective of a representative component of China’s legal framework, which 
comprises one of the key issues in the Sino-US trade frictions. Without prejudice to 
the foregoing debates on China’s convergent or divergent considerations, this arena 
reflects how China handles a technical issue with rich implications for the world’s 
economic and political developments. With this study, we cherish the humble hope 
that it might help enlighten some aspects of the contemporary debates on the 
convergence and divergence of two completely different or antithetical path 
dependencies. 
From the beginning, intellectual property rights (IPR) are widely held as an instrument 
to realize the policy goals set in terms of public interests, especially innovation and 
knowledge transfer. For instance, the 1710 Statute of Anne, Britain’s earliest copyright 
law, was established as “an Act for the encouragement of learning”. Also, the US 
Constitution in 1787 (Art I, § 8, cl 8) vests Congress with the power “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”  Historically, 
the regulation of IPRs has mingled with and depended on the political contingency, 
economic levels, and cultural settings of a country. Thus, how to achieve the balance 
between the protection of IPRs and public interests varies considerably from country 
to country.  
The disparity of national IP regimes is further aggravated by the fact that, IPRs, in 
general, assume inherent tension with public interests – a term invariably dotted with 
an elusive nature. As such, IP laws are replete with complicated and nuanced 
constructs for the purpose of balancing different interests: innovation and technology 
transfer under patent law, commercial distinction and consumer interests under 
trademark law, and authorial remuneration and access to information under copyright 
law. 
Historically, different countries employed diversified regulatory mechanism to protect 
those interests they value most in a specific stage. The US, for example, used to 
exclude foreigners from acquiring patent protection in the nineteenth century. Later, 
foreigners were allowed to acquire patents in the US, but had to pay ten times 
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application fees as much as US citizens. Similar measures obtained in the field of 
copyright protection, when piracy of British books was routine in the US. Protectionism, 
in fact, used to be the currency of many western countries in IP protection, when the 
world barely entered into the era of globalization (Khan, 2019). 
Even today, while most countries of the world are members of those international 
conventions for the protection of IPRs, it remains a fixed and universal rule that patents 
and trademarks must be granted by and registered with a local IP office before they 
could be put to lawful commercial use within that registered country or region. Only 
the exercise of copyright is often no longer confined to a nation’s border, as it is an 
IPR that will be protected automatically and independent of registry. 
Propelled by revolutionary developments of information and communication 
technologies, the mechanism of IPRs has long transcended the hedge and enclosure 
of a mere legal regime and become an indispensable component of the world’s 
innovation and trade system that aims to provide incentives, allocate resources, and 
facilitate innovation, creation and fair trade. Therefore, IPRs were interwoven into the 
agreements of the WTO as a global trade regime --- the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). It consists of an insurmountable set 
of rules of convergence for every country that relies on global trade for its economic 
growth and stability. 
While TRIPS recognizes “the underlying public policy objectives of national systems 
for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives”, the mechanism and obligations regarding the limitation of IPR in different 
circumstances are not strong enough to warrant an equal balance between IP 
protection and its restriction which is the prerequisite for realizing those policy 
objectives. The current international IP regime is, therefore, characterized as a system 
that aims merely to “ratchet up” the global standards, one that is overwhelmingly 
amenable to industrialized countries. 
Literally, China is no exception to this regime, though China’s IP regime has always 
been branded as porous or ineffective since it was established in the 1980s. This was 
particularly attributable to the fact that China’s IPR regime had been imbued with 
political tasks since the outset, namely, that it was more an instrument of social control 
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than a legal approach of promoting innovation and dividing economic interests 
between private creators and public users (Alford, 1995). During most of the post-
reform period, this was seen as the fundamental reason for China’s failure to comply 
with international IP standards, sustained by China’s claim of overwhelming 
unevenness of economic development within the country. 
Consequently, China has developed its national IP regime largely under international 
pressure, driven particularly by its own incentive of joining the process of globalization 
and digital economy (Chen, 2017). Alone the first decade of this century witnessed two 
rounds of amendments of China’s major IP laws so as to adapt its regulatory standards 
to those set forth uniformly in international conventions. It must be emphasized that 
the development and amendment of China’s IP regime resulted primarily from a series 
of trade frictions often acrimonious enough to trigger an economic confrontational state 
as it stands today between China and the US. In a sense, it was such external force 
that often highlights China’s divergence from uniform IP standards and attempts to 
bring China onto the road towards converging rules that shape and maintain the 
inspiration and energy for creation, innovation and commercialization in the long run. 
In the past decade, however, China’s standpoint concerning its IP regime has 
undergone a fundamental metamorphosis. The Chinese economy maintained steady 
growth with booming development of domestic telecommunication technologies 
exemplified by its ambitious investment in 5G race and the advent of an almost 
cashless society. As a result, China is rebuilding its IP regime with unprecedented 
consciousness. Indeed, China has taken pains to readjust its domestic regulatory 
policies, and put forward its own national IP strategies in 2008, setting the goal of 
turning IP into an engine of the country’s future innovation. Moreover, China has 
invested considerable legal resources in promoting IP reforms in legislative, 
administrative and judicial fields. 
On the surface, marching towards convergence of IP standards is an understandable 
step, since such developments merely manifest a path that most western countries 
including the US and Germany have stridden over in the past when technological 
progress transformed societies that imitate the innovation of other nations while 
ignoring IP standards into advanced countries with adamant positions of IP protection. 
Yet, beneath the ruse, a more fundamental trend of divergence is mantled in such a 
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turn to convergence. In fact, China’s recent efforts to reform and redesign its IP 
regimes aim more to subsidize the needs of its state-owned innovation system than to 
cater to the constantly changing economic and social environment. While cultural and 
political factors used to impede IP protection in China, China is gaining impetus rapidly 
in becoming both a new stakeholder in certain sectors of technological innovation and 
a new power in international economic order by boosting its IP standards with specific 
focus.  
4. China’s New Blueprint of Rebuilding Its IP Regime to Foster 
Innovation While Maintaining Political Control 
Starting in 1979 with the Law on Sino-foreign Joint Ventures, China issued a bunch of 
fundamental IP laws including the Trademark Law (1982), the Patent Law (1984), the 
Copyright Law (1990), and the Law against Unfair Competition (1993) which also 
protects trade secrets. These laws, together with a number of related laws and 
regulations, form the basis of China’s IP regulatory regime. However, it is only after 
forty years of economic reforms that China is about to jettison its entrenched role of a 
mere imitator of international economic rules and be engaged proactively in serious 
legal efforts towards rebuilding its IP regime by infusing more of its own innovation 
and trade strategies into this legal framework. This is due to several important factors 
arising in this recent decade, which shapes the current contours of global economic 
environment, especially the ongoing Sino-US trade war. In different scenarios of IP 
protection, China is taking measures to enhance a converging trend. Yet these 
measures serve less the purpose of catering to the US demands than that of China’s 
own blueprint of rebuilding its IP regime. The following part provides an analysis of 
China’s efforts of updating the most essential components of this regime, and shows 
how the legal convergence of global standards now feature China’s IP laws and prevail 
against certain divergence from such standards which will persist in foreseeable future. 
Patent Law: A Battlefield of Activating the Engine of Innovation 
As far as technology innovation is concerned, China is assuming an overall new role, 
which makes it inevitable to run a competition with its leading trade partners such as 
the US. In 2016, China issued “Administrative Measures for Determining High and 
New Technology Enterprises”, which contain measures for ascertaining “high and new 
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technology enterprises” that may enjoy certain privileged economic and tax policies. 
One of the fundamental criteria is that such enterprises possess their “core 
independent IPR” that must be registered in China or enjoy exclusive global licence 
for more than five years. By creating such a legal terminology, China aims to 
differentiate the protection of the IPRs in the possession of Chinese individuals and 
enterprises from those owned by foreigners and foreign companies. 
The US has reacted strongly to China’s emerging innovation strategy, particularly 
when this is connected with the plan of “Made in China 2025”. Pursuant to Section 182 
of the US Trade Act of 1974, the US Trade Representative has continued to place 
China on its “priority watch list” in its recent “Special 301 Report” in respect of China’s 
new move into the high technology field. The US often accuses China’s new measures 
of facilitating “core independent IPR” as “discriminatory” or “direction or facilitation of 
the acquisition of foreign companies and assets by domestic firms to obtain cutting-
edge technologies” (USTR, 2019). The recent turbulence in which Huawei is involved 
around the world is only an example of how China’s ambition of securing top innovation 
comes into fundamental conflict with leading innovators in the world. 
Perhaps the most current and arguable issue concerning patents is perceivable in a 
pending WTO dispute that the US launched at the beginning of 2019 against China 
(WTO, 2019). This dispute arises from a number of laws and regulations that the US 
and a number of country suspect will result in forced technology transfer from foreign 
companies doing business in China. The entire legal regime in question consists of 
China’s trade law, company law, contract law, and IP-related technology law. The 
dispute yet to be solved is not the concern of this article, but the core issue related to 
that dispute is patent protection. Therefore, it’s worth having a look at China’s patent 
law, before there is a chance of discussing further issues pending the result of that 
dispute in future. 
In fact, it is patent law that serves to protect and encourage inventions, practical and 
new models (utility models), and industrial designs. Since 2011, the number of patent 
applications in China has remained the top in the world, which, alone in 2016, 
outnumbered the total of patent applications of the US, Japan, and the EU (Croft, 
2019). To reinforce China’s promotion of scientific inventions in industrial areas, 
China’s legislature is ready to review an extensive revision of the existing Patent Law 
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in 2019, covering the patentability, the scope and duration of patents, the compulsory 
licence, and the liabilities for patent infringement. 
The 2019 bill will further transform international standards into Chinese law by 
updating certain rules that are not yet completely consistent with those standards. For 
one thing, the duration of term allowed for submitting patent application documents 
will be extended from 3 to 16 months upon first application. This represents a universal 
practice, which will allow transnational applicants from different countries to meet 
different demands according to their national standards. Additionally, the duration of 
protection of design patents will be extended to 15 years, which conforms to 
international standards. 
The 2019 bill imposes considerably higher amount of damages and monetary 
punishment on patent infringers, raising the standards up to 5 times the illegal income 
in case of counterfeit patents and up to 5 million Yuan in the event of deliberate 
infringements. Besides, the law establishes liabilities for Internet service providers 
(ISP) in case of online patent infringement so that patentees may directly require 
damages from ISPs should the latter fail to take actions upon being notified of potential 
infringement. 
The new bill lays down the principle of bona fides as a fundamental principle of patent 
law, which aims to ban patents that “undermine public interests” or “exclude or limit 
competition”. However, such vague terms are bound to be associated with those 
interests defined by the Chinese government, as it is the case with many other laws. 
For instance, the existing rules of China’s Patent Law (Art. 25) exclude certain 
categories from patent protection such as scientific discoveries, rules and methods for 
intellectual activities, methods for the diagnosis or treatment of diseases, animal and 
plant varieties, substances obtained by means of nuclear transformation, etc. The 
2019 revision proposes the exclusion of “nuclear transformation” itself from patent 
protection. Obviously, this is because it involves the public interest of defending 
China’s national security. 
Further, public interests are visible in the new regime of patent licence approved by 
the government. According to this bill, the government may award licence to apply 
specific patents developed by state-owned enterprises, or if a patentee explicitly 
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renders the patent open for use, or in case of the “compulsory license” where the 
government deems it necessary. These rules are compliant with another new principle 
of facilitating public access to patents, wide use of patents, and economic growth at 
large, those priorities stated in China’s national IP strategies. 
A special issue of patent protection in China is the ownership of patent rights in case 
of an invention by employees during the course of their employment. Under the current 
Patent Law, the patent rights are awarded basically to the employing units, unless a 
contract between the employing unit and the inventor or designer provides otherwise. 
In other words, Chinese law imposes profound limits on inventors in favour of the “units” 
which are, in many cases, state-owned companies and entities. The 2019 bill enriches 
the alternatives of awarding individual inventors by allowing them to share the profits 
and interests of such inventions or designs in the form of shares, futures, bonus, etc. 
so as to enhance their incentives of invention and design. 
Trademark Law: Emerging Lucrative Business Field with Imminent Regulatory 
Needs 
Further, while China aims to promote a bunch of famous Chinese brands in the world, 
many Chinese manufacturers are producing and processing products for foreign 
designers with foreign trademarks for the purpose of exporting such products. Chinese 
law allows for such practice and maintains that attaching foreign trademarks to 
products made in China is not illegal as long as such products are not sold in China. 
This is the basic legal framework that China adopts in order to promote domestic 
manufacturing, which often leads to the problem of China being accused of exporting 
counterfeit goods when such goods are sold in other countries.  
Again, the US interprets China’s legal practice as the failure to control bad-faith 
registration of trademarks and acquiescence of counterfeit goods. US industrial actors 
have reported such cases frequently to the US government with huge estimated 
economic losses (USTR, 2019, 42). Based on various data, the US identifies China as 
the world’s leading source of counterfeit goods. The 2019 OECD report estimated that 
63.4% of the world’s fake exports came from China and Hong Kong. Many of these 
goods involve fake trademarks, to the extent that the US is deeply concerned with the 
imminent needs for legal control of unwarranted trademark registration and inordinate 
trademark use in China. 
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In 2019, China’s legislature passed amendment of the Trademark Law, which focuses 
on the crackdown of bad-faith registration of trademark. The amendment seems to be 
an immediate response to the US’ reference to China’s flawed practice in its Special 
301 Report, where “third parties are able to obtain trademarks in China in bad faith 
even when the U.S. trademark is famous or well-known, and the resulting registrations 
damage the goodwill or interests of U.S. right holders” (USTR, 2019, 42). 
Above all, the amendment now makes it clear that all “bad-faith” applications for 
trademark registration will be rejected, as long as such trademarks are found to be 
“without the purpose of real use”. Applications for registering trademarks have been a 
practice of very low costs, which is the reason why many individuals and enterprises 
in China have made use of this system to register trademarks that are, in fact, identical 
to or indistinguishable from those existing famous brands. This may explain why, in 
2018, Chinese courts granted a bunch of trademarks to individuals and companies 
related to the US president (Reuters, November 6, 2018), while they had been 
registered by a number of Chinese companies beforehand for the purpose of soliciting 
illegitimate profits in China. 
This is also why the online business of trademark agency has become a highly 
lucrative sector. For instance, China’s Internet tycoon Alibaba started to provide online 
trademark registration service in December 2018 and, in the first quarter of 2019, it 
turned into China’s No. 1 trademark agency with a turnover that outpaces the total of 
the two agencies that come next to it on the list. With its unparalleled technology of 
cloud computing, artificial intelligence, block chain, etc., Alibaba will exert inestimable 
influence on the sector of trademark agency in future. 
Therefore, the amendment provides a bunch of complementary provisions that deal 
with this emerging sector. Where a trademark agency “knows or should have known” 
that a client’s trademark registration application is based on “bad faith”, it may not 
conduct business on behalf of the client. The amendment also highlights such cases 
in the process of “dissent”, namely, it allows anyone to raise objections within three 
months upon publication of preliminary approval of a registered trademark. Even if 
some acquires a registered trademark, China’s trademark administration (now 
National Intellectual Property Administration) may still declare invalidation of that 
trademark in the event such registration was based on fraud or other illicit means. 
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Importantly, as it is with the new bill on patent law, the 2019 amendment of trademark 
law largely raises the standards for punishment of bad-faith trademark infringement. 
The amount of damages used to be not more than three times the amount of actual 
losses of trademark owners or profits of infringers, whereas the amendment now lifts 
it up to not more than five times. If it is difficult to ascertain such amounts, courts may 
award damages of not more than five million Yuan compared to three million before 
the amendment. 
Notably, the Trademark Law relies on China’s social credit system for enforcement. 
For example, where a trademark agency commits any misconduct, the Chinese 
government may record it into its credit file and, in serious situations, may publish the 
record and decide to stop accepting its trademark agency business. Most recently, the 
US has raised explicit objections to the use of the social credit system in enforcing IP 
law in China. 
Copyright Law: Information Control More Than the Free Flow of Information 
China’s copyright system has certain peculiarities that are distinct from other branches 
of IP law. As an authoritarian country, China views the regulation of copyright as 
something profoundly related to its cultural identity, political ideology, and social 
control. This is most discernible in its institutional feature, namely, that copyright is not 
administered by the NIPA as it is with patent and trademark, but by China’s National 
Copyright Bureau (NCB).  
Since its formal establishment in 1985, China’s NCB has always been the same 
government body also known as the General Administration of Press and Publication, 
a team with two official titles. In 2018, China announced officially that the Central 
Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party would lead and guide this 
team as a Party-state agency, which is in charge of copyright affairs, the development 
of China’s press, and the import and export of publications. 
This institutional characteristic has rich implications. The utmost task of China’s 
copyright law, then, is to administer a nuanced policy of censorship of works that the 
Chinese government finds unacceptable, while providing copyright protection of the 
rest of the works. The free flow of information, which is regarded generally as the 
prerequisite and goal of copyright law, is more an illusion than reality. For this reason, 
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it is, practically, impossible for all foreign publications to enter the Chinese market 
without surviving the censorship test conducted by a small number of government 
officials. This was one of the underlying reasons why the US had been involved in 
decades of bitter trade talks with China before launching a WTO dispute eventually 
against China in 2009 (Chen, 2017). 
The 2009 Sino-US IP dispute at the WTO has a symbolic value (WTO, 2009). At the 
core of the dispute was the censorship threshold required for granting copyright 
protection in China. The WTO ruled in favour of the US in the end, which made it 
necessary for China to adjust the censorship rule in its copyright law. However, the 
adjustment that China made in the subsequent revision of its copyright law was only 
formalistic, leaving the question only more obscure than before. Consequently, the US 
Trade Representative refers frequently to China’s lack of the free flow of information 
as a fundamental trade barrier in many of its reports. 
As a result, China has to confront more structural problems in future. For one thing, 
online copyright piracy is still rampant in China due to the lack of effective and 
sustainable legal mechanism. The Chinese government is accustomed to the use of 
regular campaigns of filtering the web to curb and crack down on copyright-infringing 
materials, but it is a medley of different goals, the most important of which is to block 
access to those materials that wouldn’t survive the censorship or even contravene the 
standards of publication established by the Chinese government. The side effect, 
however, is that Chinese users find it psychologically legitimate to circumvent such 
campaigns, access unlicensed contents, and use piracy APPs stealthily. 
There are a number of legal measures yet to be transformed into the pending 
amendment of the Copyright Law, a project that China claimed to launch in 2011, but 
still lingers in the preparatory phase of a long legislative review. Those measures are 
expected to bring improvements, for example, on the protection against unauthorized 
transmission of live broadcast programmes by enhancing the level of criminal 
sanctions on potential infringers. The reasons for delaying the validation of these long 
prepared amendments are complex. But, again, the interests of governmental bodies 
in granting licence to publishers and distributors constitute an obvious barrier. 
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IP-related Trade and Investment Law: Unfulfilled Promises Awaiting 
Enforcement 
Other relevant IP laws could be found sporadically in China’s competition laws, trade 
laws, and investment laws. But this patchwork renders, at best, merely a fragmentary 
legal framework possible, which leaves many loopholes in the protection of IP-related 
interests of foreign enterprises in China. This is also one of the most disputable issues 
at stake in bilateral or multilateral negotiations between China and other major 
industrial countries. 
For example, the protection of trade and commercial secrets is of widespread concern 
to foreign investors, but one can only find relevant regulations in a bunch of laws, 
regulations, and judicial interpretations. When interpreting the Law against Unfair 
Competition, the Supreme People’ Court (SPC) defines trade secrets with three 
distinct features: they must be “unknown to the public” and “capable of bringing 
economic benefit to the owners, whilst assuming practical applicability”. Besides, rights 
owners must have taken “security measures” to protect them. In 2018, China also 
enacted an amendment of that law with regard to the protection of trade secrets. In 
2019, the SPC issues a new judicial interpretation concerning preliminary junctions for 
the purpose of protecting IP and trade secrets. 
However, what “unknown to the public” means in different parts of the world is highly 
controversial. Besides, many companies are unaware of the need and means of taking 
security measures to protect information that they think could be classified as “trade 
secrets”. In legal practice, Chinese courts often consider factors beyond the 
abovementioned elements such as the need to balance the interests of those 
companies against the interests of employees who disclose confidential information of 
the companies they work for. In this case, companies suffer systematically from 
infringement of trade secrets, as the law fails to impose punishment stringent enough 
to deter rampant infringement. Besides, no law addresses the case where such 
commercial secrets are submitted to government bodies, which seems to be an 
inevitable question for a country that relies heavily on state-owned enterprises for 
advancement of the national economy. 
Another recent statute in respect of IP protection and, in particular, technology transfer 
is the Foreign Investment Law of 2019. The law was supposed to replace the previous 
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company laws applicable to foreign enterprises in China. As a result of hard trade 
negotiations with the US, the law explicitly bans stealing IP and commercial secrets 
from foreign companies as well as coercive policies of technology transfer that 
governments might impose on foreign enterprises. Violation of these principles may 
lead to criminal sanctions. China’s legislature passed the law in a swift process that 
few laws would have the privilege to undergo. Apparently, this represents China’s 
efforts to address some common concerns of foreign governments and business. 
However, it is highly doubtful whether such broad principles could be enforced 
effectively in practice without further laws and regulations specifying those vague 
terms. This is a common issue of similar laws in China that merely serve to announce 
the so-called fundamental principles without feasible details of legal enforcement. In 
fact, Chinese government officials are often reported to have either ignored or denied 
the existence of forced technology transfer. In the turmoil of Sino-US trade war, public 
authorities in China feel it legitimate to reject such accusations as purely fabricated 
out of political hostility (Xinhua, May 29, 2018). 
Besides, the Foreign Investment Law allows the Chinese government to expropriate 
the investment of foreign investors for the public interest, on the condition that the 
latter will be offered “fair and reasonable compensation”. Finally, foreign investment is 
subject to China’s national security reviews whose decisions are final and binding. 
These provisions could serve as the basis for the Chinese government to take 
retaliatory measures against companies from countries that the Chinese government 
is not aligned with, which might exert negative influence on the incentive of foreign 
companies to initiate innovation or facilitate legitimate technology transfer in China. 
5. Conclusion 
China’s economic reforms assume an antithetical aspect from the very beginning, but 
it becomes increasingly obvious that the economic convergence cannot offset the 
political divergence in the global context. Currently, such an antithesis is reflected by 
trade frictions more condensed than ever, which coalesce around the discrepancies 
with regard to the acquisition and protection of IPRs, especially in the areas of 
industrial innovation (patent), commercial values (trademark), information and cultural 
products (copyright), and technology transfer (trade and commercial secrets).  
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The recent developments of China’s intellectual property regime exhibit such conflicts 
of interests as a key component of its knowledge-driven and innovation-oriented 
economy. In fact, the clash between China’s political divergence and its economic 
convergence is highlighted in its decade-long reforms, in particular, by the 
contradictions between China’s state-oriented innovation system and the world’s neo-
liberal economic order. This is a natural outcome of China’s economic developments. 
In core areas such as high-tech products and industrial innovation, the last decade 
witnessed China’s preeminent transformation from a passive follower to a proactive 
advocator of IP standards. In a sense, this represents China’s progress in 
technological and commercial fields, which underpins China’s role as an endorser of 
strong IP protection in future. 
However, certain entrenched limits characterizing China’s state-oriented economy and 
cultural system such as information blockade and coercive technology transfer may 
serve as catalysts that are apt to provoke acrimonious confrontation between China 
and major economies. The current narrative in the Sino-US trade war fully reveals the 
systematic clashes between the world’s two biggest economies. What used to lurk 
behind numerous cooperation opportunities in the most populous country now shows 
up as a corner of an iceberg. In other words, China’s incomplete reforms have taken 
on a new form: as China’s influence on the global economy grows, conflicts of diverse 
national priorities become more palpable than simple-minded economic cooperation. 
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